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1. Introduction 
 
Most emerging markets in the world have gone through a well-documented process of 
liberalisation and integration over the last 30 years. Bekaert, Harvey, & Lumsdaine (2002) 
estimate that most emerging economies started this process between the end of the 1980’s 
and the first half of the 1990’s. Edison & Warnock (2003), looking at the intensity of capital 
controls, show that most emerging markets attained greater and greater openness over the 
1990-2000 period, finding comparable results to Bekaert et al. (2002). As a result of these 
liberalisations, cross-border portfolio flows towards emerging economies substantially 
increased from the second half of the 1990s till the start of the financial crisis.1 After a 
slowdown during the crisis period, cross-border flows towards emerging economies surged 
again for a couple of years (Forbes and Warnock, 2012) to then reach stable and sizable levels 
after 2011 (own elaboration on IMF data).2 Cross border portfolio flows have accounted for a 
non-negligible fraction of emerging markets’ GDP and capital accounts since the crisis (Ahmed 
and Zlate, 2014; Ghosh et al., 2014) and are expected to be relevant in size for the year 2018.3   
Considering these trends, we believe that studying the determinants of cross-border portfolio 
flows is a worthwhile topic of investigation (Ahmed, 2017). This paper focuses on a particular 
                                                          
1 Ghosh, Qureshi, Kim, & Zalduendo (2014) document a sharp increase in portfolio inflows to emerging 
economies between the year 2000 and the financial crisis, capping nearly 8% of EME’s aggregate GDP in 2006.  
2 In 2011 portfolio flows saw an abrupt slowdown (Yang, 2016; own elaboration on IMF data). For an illustration 
of these trends till 2013 see Ahmed & Zlate (2014) and James et al. (2014). 
3 The Institute for International Finance (2017) estimates that international portfolio inflows towards emerging 
markets will be above 270 billion USD in 2018. Using IMF data, we calculate that net portfolio investment 
towards emerging countries was over 71 billion USD during Q1 2018.  
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component of cross-border portfolio flows, equity investment. The reason is twofold. On one 
hand, following the mid-90s liberalisations most of emerging equity exchanges have attracted 
important levels of foreign participation and trading, which in turn arguably contributed to 
their own growth and development (Errunza, 2001; Han Kim and Singal, 2000) and to the 
growth and development of their economies (Levine and Zervos, 1998).4 In fact, many of these 
exchanges have over the years consolidated their positions as globally important financial 
institutions, reaching levels of market capitalisation that are comparable to those of advanced 
economies5 and are important shares of their own countries’ GDPs.6 On the other hand, 
however, relatively few rather dated contributions specifically deal with cross-border equity 
flows (Brennan and Cao, 1997a; Chintrakarn, 2007; Edison and Warnock, 2008; Froot et al., 
2001; Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005). We therefore aim to update and expand the 
evidence on the topic, providing additional empirical results using data that include the post-
crisis period.  
                                                          
4 In fact, it is argued that to stimulate liquidity, emerging markets should find a good balance between domestic 
institutional, domestic retail and international participation, thus supporting the idea that some levels of 
international participation are needed to maintain a good level of market liquidity (WFE and Oliver Wyman, 
2016; Alderighi, 2017). 
5 Several emerging markets have reached a market capitalisation of over one trillion USD, namely: B3; BSE India 
Limited; Johannesburg Stock Exchange; NSE India Limited; Shanghai Stock Exchange; Shenzhen Stock Exchange; 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (Source WFE Monthly Reports, April 2018).  
6 The market capitalisation of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Bursa Malaysia and the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange as of December 2017 was larger than their countries’ GDPs (120%, 144% and 352% respectively). In 
India, United Arab Emirates and Jordan market capitalisation was more than 50% of their GDP, and in Brazil it 
nearly capped 50% in December 2017 (Source: World Bank).  
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We exploit a unique proprietary database containing information on foreign institutional 
participation and trading from a sample of emerging exchanges7 to investigate the 
determinants of cross-border portfolio equity inflows towards emerging markets.8 We firstly 
assess whether it is mostly push (foreign market returns and volatility, and the correlation 
between foreign and local market returns) or pull factors (domestic market returns and 
volatility) to influence cross-border flows. We then study what levers and interventions, 
conditional on push and pull factors, are mostly effective in attracting equity inflows towards 
emerging markets. We estimate linear regression models that control for market and time 
fixed effects as well as for a rich set of controls. Our database contains monthly information 
for 20 geographically diverse emerging and frontier market exchanges over the 2006-2018 
period and is a representative sample of emerging and frontier markets worldwide. Thus, our 
results are generalisable to the population of emerging and frontier markets and expand the 
external validity of the evidence on the topic.9  
                                                          
7 We use the term “emerging markets” loosely to indicate any market that is not classified as advanced by either 
FTSE or MSCI. This categorisation includes advanced emerging, emerging and frontier markets. 
8 We study gross inflows, that is the mere difference between foreign buys and sells of stocks listed in the 
domestic market, without subtracting net outflows from domestic investors. The literature debates whether 
gross or net inflows should be studied (Ahmed, 2017; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Ghosh et al., 2014). Given that 
exchanges are the primary focus of this paper we study the determinants of gross inflows, as foreign investment 
of domestic investors is beyond the control of stock markets. We agree however that for macroeconomic 
purposes the determinants of net (rather than gross) inflows would be more relevant (Ghosh et al., 2014). 
9 The markets are (in alphabetical order): Amman Stock Exchange (Jordan), Athens Stock Exchange (Greece), B3 
(Brazil), Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (Colombia), Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (India), Borsa Istanbul 
(Turkey), Bursa Malaysia (Malaysia), Colombo Stock Exchange (Sri Lanka), Dubai Financial Market (United Arab 
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We find that pull factors matter more than push ones in explaining cross-border flows. 
Domestic market returns account for an important share of monthly inflows towards 
emerging markets: a one-percentage point increase in domestic returns is associated with a 
24.4 USD million increase in cross-border flows, roughly 35% of the average monthly inflows 
in the sample. Likewise, domestic market volatility shows a negative correlation with inflows: 
a one-percent increase in domestic volatility is associated with a decrease in inflows equal to 
9.5 million USD, 13% of the average monthly inflows in the sample. On the other hand, returns 
from foreign countries, their respective correlations with domestic returns and foreign 
market uncertainty show weak statistical significance and contribute proportionally less to 
the model’s variance, suggesting that push factors are not as important in explaining inflows 
towards emerging economies. 
We also find that removing barriers to investment and enhancing corporate governance 
standards are the most effective levers in attracting cross-border flows, conditional on push 
and pull factors. For example, a country removing capital inflows restrictions sees an increase 
in inflows equal to 302 million USD over the sample period (significant at the 1% level). 
Similarly, a market introducing a full set of well-accepted corporate governance standards 
(Aggarwal et al., 2011, 2009) is found to attract foreign inflows as high as 756 million in the 
                                                          
Emirates), Johannesburg Stock Exchange (South Africa), Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (Kazakhstan), Moscow 
Exchange (Russia), Nairobi Securities Exchange (Kenya), National Stock Exchange of India Limited (India), 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (Nigeria), Stock Exchange of Mauritius (Mauritius), Taipei Exchange (Taiwan), Taiwan 
Stock Exchange (Taiwan), The Egyptian Exchange (Egypt), The Stock Exchange of Thailand (Thailand). The 
aggregate market capitalization of these markets was 10.4 trillion USD as at December 2017 and accounted for 
43% of the market capitalization of the emerging and frontier world. Source: MSCI, FTSE Russel (for the 
categorisation), WFE monthly reports (for market capitalisation).   
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long-run (significant at the 1% level). Removing information barriers if found to attract sizable 
inflows, but the importance of these levers is less relevant from a statistical point of view. For 
example, after inclusion in in the MSCI Emerging Market Index, the average market is found 
to attract roughly 350 million USD inflows in the long run, but this coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10% level only. We find that market structure and post-trade infrastructure 
features have a less relevant correlation with inflows.  
We add to the literature in several ways. To start with, we use of a more comprehensive 
sample with respect to previous studies on the topic, comprised of a large number of markets 
(20 in total) observed at a monthly frequency for a long period of time (more than 11 years). 
As we demonstrate (see Section 5.1.), this sample is representative of the population of 
emerging and frontier equity markets worldwide: our results therefore enhance the external 
validity of the evidence on the topic. In addition, our sample includes the post-crisis period, 
and thus allows us to assess the behaviour of international investors after the crisis, therefore 
expanding the existing evidence on the topic which is mostly pre-2007. We are the first to 
explicitly introduce domestic market volatility and the correlation between foreign and 
domestic market returns in study on push/pull factors, and therefore include relevant 
variables omitted by the previous literature. Finally, our paper studies the influence of 
characteristics that have been somewhat neglected by previous literature, namely market 
structure and post-trade infrastructure features, two components that are relevant in 
reducing the direct costs to invest/trade in a given exchange and should therefore be 
considered as relevant determinants of cross-border flows.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 frames the contribution in the 
literature. Section 3 describes the database used for the empirical estimations. Section 4 
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describes the empirical model. Section 5 reports the main regression results. Section 6 
provides a discussion and suggestions for future research on the topic.  
2. Related literature 
In this section we review the literature on the topic to identify the most relevant determinants 
of cross-border portfolio equity flows.  
2.1. Push and pull factors 
Research on cross border equity flows has typically studied whether these are determined by 
characteristics of the source (foreign) country that affect the existing supply of funds (“push 
factors”) or by demand-side characteristics of the destination (domestic) market (“pull 
factors”) (Ghosh et al.,2014).10 Ghosh et al. (2014) suggest that both push and pull factors are 
likely to influence equity inflows at the same time, as push factors shift the supply of funds 
while pull factors shift their demand. Several contributions study the determinants of cross-
border capital flows with a specific focus on equity inflows towards emerging economies 
(Brennan and Cao, 1997; Edison and Warnock, 2008; Froot et al., 2001; Griffin et al., 2004; 
Richards, 2005). These therefore lie at the core of our identification of relevant push and pull 
factors. 
2.1.1. Push factors 
When assessing the relevance of push factors, the literature has mostly focused on returns 
from foreign countries (Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005). The relation between foreign 
returns and cross-border inflows is controversial: while on one hand higher foreign returns 
would encourage foreign investors to invest in their own country (what we can assimilate to 
                                                          
10 Note that for the rest of the paper, we will use the term “foreign” to identify the country where capitals are 
originated, and we will use the term “domestic” to identify the destination country of investments.  
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a “substitution effect”), on the other hand higher returns provide foreign investors with more 
spare resources to invest abroad (what we can refer to as an “income effect” and is typically 
referred to as a “wealth effect” in the literature: see Brennan and Cao (1997); Edison and 
Warnock (2008, page 2021)). To identify foreign returns (as controlling for returns from any 
possible country in the world is not possible), the literature has focused on the 
countries/regions that have historically been the largest source of outbound investment: 
usually the US and Western Europe.11 In some studies, US and European returns have been 
shown to be positively correlated with inflows, thus supporting the wealth effect 
interpretation (Aron et al., 2010; Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005), 
while other studies find no such relationship (Brennan and Cao, 1997).12 
Volatility of foreign markets is also regarded as a relevant push factor, and one that is 
expected to be negatively correlated with inflows, as international investors typically prefer 
to invest in advanced economies in times of higher uncertainty (Ghosh et al., 2014). Similar 
to returns, it is not possible to control for market volatility in every country in the world. Aron 
et al. (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2014) therefore use US market volatility (either the VIX index 
                                                          
11 According to Leuz et al. (2009), half of the foreign portfolio investment worldwide can be attributed to US 
investors alone. The IMF estimated that the US accounted for 30.2% of foreign investment in equity and 
investment funds worldwide as of June 2017. They also estimated that the European Economic Area accounted 
for 40.8% of foreign investment in equity and investment funds worldwide, with the UK alone representing 7.7% 
and Germany 4.3% as of June 2017 (Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey). In a related research, 
the authors estimated that the United States alone accounted for nearly 42% of the funds toward EBRD countries 
as at H2 2017, followed by the United Kingdom followed with 20% of the holdings (WFE and EBRD, 2018). 
12 Edison and Warnock (2008) find instead that higher US interest rates and above-trend US economic activity 
are negatively related with inflows, in line with the “substitution effect” hypothesis.  
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or volatility calculated on the S&P 500 returns) in their regression specifications, arguing that 
the US market volatility is a globally applicable measure of investors’ uncertainty.13 As 
expected, these contributions find a negative relationship between levels of the VIX index and 
inflows (Aron et al., 2010; Ghosh et al., 2014; Yang, 2016). 
Another potentially relevant push factor is the correlation between foreign and domestic 
returns. Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2011) find that international investors tend to invest more 
in countries in which returns are negatively correlated with their own countries’ returns, i.e. 
they exploit hedging opportunities at an international level (see also Portes and Rey (2005)). 
Levy and Levy (2014) note however that the increasing integration of financial markets 
hampers these very same opportunities, as returns tend to show increasingly high positive 
correlations at an international level.  
2.1.2. Pull factors 
The literature has mostly concentrated on domestic returns when assessing the relevance of 
pull factor. In a seminal contribution, Bohn and Tesar (1996) find that net purchases of 
equities by US investors are positively related with the expected domestic excess of returns 
in 12 out of 22 countries in their sample. They attribute this finding to return-chasing 
behaviour. The theoretical formulations of Brennan and Cao (1997) and Griffin et al. (2004) 
predict that domestic returns should attract foreign inflows, and find empirical support for 
this prediction. Likewise, Richards (2005) finds that domestic returns attract more foreign 
inflows.  
                                                          
13 For more information on the CBOE VIX index please refer to: http://www.cboe.com/vix 
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Somewhat surprisingly, if one excludes Edison and Warnock (2008), the literature has 
somewhat neglected domestic market uncertainty/volatility as a relevant pull factor, despite 
even the theoretical specifications of some of the cited contributions predict a negative 
relation between net purchases and domestic volatility (Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Griffin et al., 
2004). We however believe that domestic market risk should be considered as a relevant pull 
factor (Edison and Warnock, 2008).  
Finally, many asset managers implement passive investment strategies and track well-
recognised indices, such as the MSCI and/or FTSE Emerging Markets and Frontier Markets 
Indices (EBRD and IPREO, 2018).14 To the extent that the rates of returns on these indices 
influence international investors’ sentiment (Richards, 2005), their performance should be 
considered as a relevant pull factor.15 
2.2. Longer-run determinants 
The contributions that are perhaps the most similar to this paper, Richards (2005) and Griffin 
et al. (2004), use daily trading data to estimate the determinants of cross-border equity 
inflows. These papers mainly study whether foreign and domestic returns influence inflows, 
without focusing on longer-run factors (likely, because of the frequency of their data). As our 
                                                          
14 This argument is strongly supported by conversations with stock exchange representatives and buy-side 
investors.  
15 Strictly speaking, macroeconomic factors and stock market characteristics might also be considered among 
pull factors, following the definitions found in Ghosh et al. (2014) and Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1996), and 
the literature on capital flows (Ahmed, 2017; Yang, 2016).  In this contribution, we consider them as control 
variables, because we decided to focus our attention on return and risk factors, in accordance with the literature 
on cross-border equity flows (Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005; Edison and Warnock, 2008).  
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data allows us to study inflows at a monthly frequency (see Section 4), we decided to 
investigate whether additional, longer run characteristics influence cross-border equity 
inflows, adopting a similar strategy to Edison and Warnock (2008). To identify these 
characteristics, we borrow from the related literatures on the home-bias16 (Ahearne et al., 
2004; Chan et al., 2005; Dahlquist et al., 2003; Eichler, 2012; Kang, 1997; Lau et al., 2010; Levy 
and Levy, 2014) and on cross-border capital inflows (Ahmed et al., 2005; Ahmed, 2017; Aron 
et al., 2010; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Ghosh et al., 2014). 
2.2.1. Explicit barriers to investment 
During the 1990s, explicit barriers to investment (such as capital controls or ownership 
restrictions for foreign investors) were considered the main determinants of the home bias. 
Following the liberalisation process many emerging markets went through during the mid-
1990s (Bekaert et al., 2002; Edison and Warnock, 2003), the home bias was expected to 
reduce. As instead the home bias persisted, economists started looking for the cause of the 
phenomenon elsewhere (Ahearne et al., 2004; Levy and Levy, 2014).  
Nonetheless, international financial markets are still far from being perfectly integrated, and 
capital controls and ownership restrictions persist in many emerging and frontier economies 
                                                          
16 The home bias is the well-documented tendency of domestic investors to attribute excessive weight to 
domestic stocks in their portfolios. This empirical regularity is at odds with the predictions of the International 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, according to which investors should in fact hold the world portfolio (Lintner, 1965; 
Sharpe, 1964). Explicit barriers to investment and information asymmetries are typically used to explain the 
home-bias. For an excellent literature review on the topic see Ahearne et al. (2004).  
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(Edison and Warnock, 2008).17 These are expected, when present, to hamper capital inflows 
(OMFIF and Barclays, 2017) and exacerbate the home bias (Ahearne et al., 2004). In addition, 
the literature finds that local market frictions, such as higher tax rates, reduce equity inflows 
and increase the home-bias (Chan et al., 2005). These should therefore also be considered as 
explicit barriers to investment.  
2.2.2. Information costs 
As mentioned, the literature agrees that explicit barriers to investment alone are not enough 
to fully explain the home bias (Ahearne et al., 2004). Building upon the theoretical framework 
proposed by Merton (1987), the literature postulates that foreign investment would also be 
hampered by the indirect, non-explicit barrier represented by information costs. That is, 
foreign investors would tilt their portfolios towards stocks in the home market as they lack 
awareness, familiarity and information on securities abroad, and obtaining such information 
is costly (Ahearne et al., 2004; Kang, 1997; Portes and Rey, 2005). The empirical evidence 
confirms that information asymmetries induce higher degrees of home bias: for example 
Portes and Rey (2005) find that distance is an important (negative) determinant of cross-
border flows. As stock trading does not imply any physical transfer, they attribute the negative 
correlation between distance and portfolio equity investment between countries to 
information asymmetry: that is, foreign investors would know less about (and therefor invest 
less in) distant markets or securities. Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2011) also find that greater 
                                                          
17 From a case study interview it emerged that Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires didn’t have any international 
participation between 2011 and 2015, because of strict capital controls imposed by the Argentinian government 
during that period. China is perhaps the most relevant example of a large emerging economy that imposes 
barriers on foreign participation and trading, with the presence (for example) of different share classes for 
foreign investors. On China, see Ding et al. (2013); Wei et al. (2005). 
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distance hampers cross-border flows but that the presence of a common language and a 
similar legal system are positively correlated with equity inflows.  
2.2.3. Institutional quality, rule of law and corporate governance standards 
While drawing a line between explicit barriers to investment and information costs is 
relatively simple, the literature has treated features that might well be considered among 
“information costs” as discreet categories.18 We follow Chan et al. (2005) and consider 
institutional and regulatory quality as discreet characteristics with respect to interventions 
aimed at reducing information asymmetries. The literature agrees that foreign asset 
managers prefer to invest in countries characterised by higher corporate governance 
standards, higher institutional quality and stricter rule of law (OMFIF and Barclays, 2017). For 
example, Dahlquist et al. (2003) find that US investors tend to invest less in countries 
characterised by a higher expropriation risk index. Leuz et al. (2009) show that US investors 
tend to invest less in tightly held firms (such as family owned and managed businesses), but 
only in countries with low securities regulation, low disclosure requirements and where the 
legal system is not Anglo-Saxon (common law). On the same lines, Eichler (2012) finds that 
US investors do not necessarily invest more in countries with higher de jure disclosure 
standards but weight more countries where corporate disclosure is applied de facto, 
emphasising how it is the enforcement rather than the mere presence of a rule to attract 
international investors.  
2.2.4. Market structure and post-trade infrastructure 
                                                          
18 Ahearne et al. (2004) for example consider low accounting standards and low scores on rule of law as 
information barriers, while other contributions (Dahlquist et al., 2003) consider them as institutional quality 
indicators.  
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The literature has neglected the relevance of market structure in attracting international 
investors to the market. Yet, it is shown that several market structure features serve to 
enhance market and/or stock liquidity and improve price discovery. These include, among 
others: market-making (Biais et al., 2016; Charitou and Panayides, 2009; Pagano and Röell, 
1996), direct market access (Oliver Wyman and WFE, 2016), securities lending and borrowing 
(Dreff, 2010) and colocation (Brogaard et al., 2015). These features benefit local investors as 
much as foreign ones, and therefore might have a role in attracting foreign participants.   
Similarly, the introduction of a CCP should in principle mitigate counterparty risk (Cont and 
Kokholm, 2014; Duffie and Zhu, 2011; Loon and Zhong, 2014) and therefore make trading 
more appealing for all market participants (including foreign investors). Foreign investors 
might therefore be tempted to invest more in exchanges where a CCP is present. 
3. Database description 
Analyses are performed on a proprietary longitudinal database collected from exchange 
members of the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) during the first half of 2018.19 During 
May 2018, the authors submitted a data-entry template to all WFE emerging market 
members.20 Forms were filled by representatives working at the member exchanges with 
                                                          
19 Established in 1961, the World Federation of Exchanges is a global industry association that represents more 
than 200 financial market infrastructures and clearinghouses around the world. Membership is acquired through 
an application process and a formal evaluation of whether the market (or clearinghouse) meets minimum 
criteria of regulation, transparency and economic relevance.  
20 The activity of the WFE is organized around thematic working groups, composed by member exchanges who 
voluntarily decide to take part in them. One of the working groups is centered around emerging markets (the 
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quantitative data points on foreign trading (value and number of foreign trades, split by buys 
and sells), and on the number of ETFs and depository receipts listed on their market. The 
quantitative data collected is not an estimation, but represents the actual amount of trading 
and/or listed financial products in a given month. The form also contained a section dedicated 
to qualitative information on policies, interventions and characteristics likely to influence 
foreign participation and trading. In particular, we obtained information on: 
▪ Capital controls and other restrictions to foreign investors (for example, ownership 
restrictions); 
▪ Corporate governance requirements for listed companies; 
▪ Presence of dividend and capital gains taxes and stamp duties; 
▪ Whether the market requires or recommends disclosure in English language; 
▪ Whether listed companies have to adhere to IFRS accounting standards; 
▪ Market structure characteristics (presence of Market Making, DMA, SLB, Short-selling, 
Colocation); 
▪ Presence of a CCP.  
We collected monthly data from 20 emerging markets, covering the January 2006 - April 2018 
period, although some markets did not manage to provide data for the whole sample period. 
Therefore, our database is an unbalanced panel.  
The so-collected database was merged to a database containing WFE market level indicators 
at a monthly frequency as well as market-level and macroeconomic indicators collected from 
a variety of sources (see Appendix A in the Supplementary Materials for greater detail). The 
resulting database amounts to more than 2,000 observations. 
4. The empirical model 
 
4.1. The model specification 
                                                          
Emerging Markets Working Group, EMWG). The data template was submitted to EMWG representatives, as well 
as to emerging market exchanges not belonging to the EMWG. 
 16 
 
The relevance of the determinants identified in Section 2 is tested using regression analyses 
on (restrictions to) the following linear specification: 
Equation 1: The model specification 
E[Equity inflows 𝑖𝑡| 𝑋]
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽2 𝑃𝑢𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +   𝛽10𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 (1)  
For each of the factors and levers described in Section 2, we provide a brief description of 
their empirical counterparts.  
4.1.1. Dependent variables: equity inflows 
Stock markets submitted data on monthly value of buy and sell trades performed by 
international investors. We follow Griffin et al. (2004) and calculate equity inflows as the value 
of foreign buys minus the value of foreign sells. We follow Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
and identify foreign trading as buys and sells performed by a foreign investor and not by a 
foreign dealer (stock markets indicated that dealers are required to flag foreign buys and 
sells).21  We perform our analyses using unscaled inflows (differently from Griffin et al. (2004) 
and Froot et al. (2001) who scale inflows by market capitalisation). We however perform the 
                                                          
21 As pointed out in several contributions (see for example Choe et al., 2005; Griffin et al., 2004), a limitation of 
foreign trading and ownership data is that a domestic investor trading through a foreign institution would be 
recorded as a foreign trade. As submitting exchanges require traders to flag whether the investor is foreign, we 
believe this problem does not affect our data. 
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same analyses using scaled inflows as a robustness check, finding comparable results.22 
Formally: 
Equation 2: Dependent variable 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 (2) 
To make sure that the indicator works as it should, we cross-check it against foreign 
ownership data (percentage of market capitalisation held by foreign investors) obtained from 
10 out of 20 of the submitting exchanges. Intuitively, inflows should be positively correlated 
with foreign ownership. We sum up past inflows to calculate quarterly, semi-annual and 
annual inflows, and assess the correlation of these variables with the foreign ownership one. 
We find that cumulative inflows are positively correlated with foreign ownership in seven out 
of 10 of the markets, with statistically significant correlations (at the 0.1% level) increasing in 
magnitude as the frequency of capital inflows goes down. We report a correlation matrix and 
a time series plot for a selected exchange in Table B1 and Figure B1 Appendix B 
(Supplementary Materials). As a second cross-check, we also aggregate inflows and compare 
them with data from the IMF, finding that the two time series are highly correlated (see Figure 
2 in Section 4).  
4.1.2.  Push factors 
                                                          
22 Given the purpose of our study, we believe that levels of foreign inflows would work better than the share of 
foreign inflows over market capitalisation as many of the considered policy levers and determinants would 
market capitalisation as well (and therefore the denominator of the dependent variable). This would make the 
marginal effect of the regressors on the dependent variable tricky to interpret without a structural specification: 
stock market returns would for example positively influence both capital inflows, but also market capitalisation 
through domestic and foreign trading activity. See footnote 7 in Griffin et al. (2004) for a discussion.   
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We follow the cited literature (Aron et al., 2010; Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005) and use 
US and European returns as our main push factor. We calculate returns as the log differences 
of the end-of-month values of the Dow Jones, S&P500, DAX, FTSE100 and CAC40 indices.  
To capture international uncertainty, we include in the specification end-of-month values of 
the VIX index, following Aron et al. (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2014).  
We control for the correlation between domestic and foreign returns. We follow Portes and 
Rey (2005) and calculate the correlation between foreign and local returns as the rolling 
correlation of end-of-month returns over the past 12-month period. We calculate correlation 
scores between domestic returns and returns on the foreign indices mentioned above (Dow 
Jones, S&P500, DAX, FTSE100 and CAC40), thus obtaining five different variables. To make 
sure that the indicator works as it should, we test the documented regularity that correlation 
of market returns increases during periods of market turmoil/instability (see Chesnay and 
Jondeau, 2001; Knif et al., 2005, and related literature). We find that our estimates are 
positively correlated with both domestic and US/international volatility as measured by the 
VIX index, and that these relations are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. We report the 
correlation matrix in Table B2 in Appendix B (Supplementary Materials). 
4.1.3. Pull factors 
We calculate monthly domestic returns as the log difference of the end-of-month values of 
domestic exchanges’ broad market indices.  
We calculate daily volatility as the standard deviation of the returns on the broad market 
index calculated over the previous 22 trading days. Monthly volatility is calculated as the 
average of the daily volatilities for the month, scaled up by the square root of 22, as common 
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practice in the industry.23 In Appendix B, we show how that our measure is highly correlated 
with volatility measures implemented by some of the submitting exchanges, supporting the 
robustness of our calculation (see Figures B2 and B3 in Appendix B, Supplementary Materials).  
Finally, we calculate returns on the MSCI Emerging Markets and Frontier Indices and on the 
FTSE Emerging Market Index as the log differences of end-of-month values (Richards, 2005). 
4.1.4. Explicit barriers to investment 
While it is clear that explicit barriers to investment raise transaction costs for foreign investors 
thus lowering their returns (Edison and Warnock, 2008; Griffin et al., 2004; Stulz, 1981), in 
practice identifying these barriers (or a relaxation of such barriers) is more challenging. As 
mentioned in Bekaert et al. (2002), the market liberalisation process is very complex, and 
entails intertwined reforms and policies that affect both financial markets and the real 
economy, and in turn have an impact on macroeconomic conditions by and large (Bekaert et 
al., 2005). 
To control for explicit barriers to investment, we created “rule based measures” (Edison and 
Warnock, 2003), focusing our attention on levers that are either commonly mentioned in the 
academic literature and/or for policy purposes. More specifically, in addition to surveying the 
literature (Bekaert et al., 2002; Chan et al., 2005; Edison and Warnock, 2008; OMFIF and 
Barclays, 2017) we used the IMF AREAER reports (IMF, 2016) and the methodology used by 
S&P to calculate the Investment Weight Factor (IWF) for inclusion into IFCI indices (S&P Dow 
Jones Indices, 2018) to identify what both the academic literature and practitioners in the 
                                                          
23 The methodology mirrors that of the volatility measure adopted by Borsa Istanbul: 
http://www.borsaistanbul.com/en/data/data/equity-market-data/index-data/volatility. 
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industry commonly regard as barriers to foreign investment. We identified the following 
broad categories: 
• General ownership restrictions to foreign investors (either individual or collective); 
• Sectorial ownership restrictions to foreign participation (either individual or 
collective); 
• Presence of different classes of shares for foreign investors; 
• Capital inflow restrictions; and 
• Capital repatriation restrictions.  
We then asked stock exchanges to indicate whether, during the January 2006 – April 2018 
period, any of the above barriers were in place, and if so, to provide a brief description and 
indicate for what period. Recognising the importance of local market frictions, such as taxes 
(Chan et al., 2005), we also asked exchanges to report whether during the sample period they 
had capital gain taxes, dividend taxes and stamp duties. After reviewing the data submissions, 
we codified the information received and created a dummy variable for each of the above 
levers. 
4.1.5. Information costs 
As mentioned, information asymmetries are important in explaining the home bias (Ahearne 
et al., 2004). While it is in principle clear that reducing informational barriers should in 
principle attract portfolio inflows (Chan et al., 2005; Kang, 1997; Leuz et al., 2009), identifying 
what measures should be adopted is not straightforward. The literature uses very different 
measures of information asymmetries/costs. Based on the literature and on explorative 
dialogues with exchange representatives, we identified the following levers:  
• Recommended/compulsory disclosure in English language (as the literature generally 
controls for common language: see Chan et al., 2005; Coeurdacier and Guibaud, 2011; 
Portes and Rey, 2005); and 
• Adherence of listed companies to IFRS accounting standards (Ahearne et al., 2004; 
OMFIF and Barclays, 2017). 
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We then asked stock exchanges to indicate whether, during the January 2006 – April 2018 
period, any of the above was in place, and if so to provide a brief description and indicate for 
what period. After reviewing the data submissions, we codified the information we received 
and created a dummy variable for each indicator. 
We also control whether a country/market is included in the MSCI Emerging Markets or 
Frontier Markets Index (loosely following Leuz et al., 2009), as inclusion in a well-recognised 
index is a signal that a country/market complies with certain minimum standards in terms of 
corporate governance, institutional quality, rule of law. Inclusion in an index therefore de 
facto lowers information costs for investors. We received information on whether and when 
a country was introduced in the respective indices directly from MSCI. 
4.1.6.  Institutional quality, rule of law and corporate governance standards 
In Section 2 we emphasised how international investors prefer markets with high corporate 
governance standards, levels of investors protection and certainty of law enforcement 
(Dahlquist et al., 2003; Eichler, 2012; Leuz et al., 2009). These characteristics are typically 
difficult to measure. In particular, corporate governance requirements are liable to be 
different across jurisdictions, making a direct comparison between different countries 
challenging. Referencing Aggarwal et al. (2009) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) we used what they 
identified as the most studied corporate governance requirements among academics and 
policymakers, namely: 
• If there is a single class of common shares; 
• If the CEO and Chairman positions have to be held by different people; 
• If the board has a minimum size; 
• If the board is comprised of a minimum share of independent directors; 
• If the audit committee is comprised of a minimum share of independent members; 
and 
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• If the audit committee is ratified annually.24  
We then asked stock exchanges to indicate whether, during the January 2006 – April 2018 
period, any of these corporate governance practices was in place, and if so to provide a brief 
description and indicate for what period. After reviewing the data submissions, we codified 
the information submitted by exchanges and created a dummy variable for each of them. We 
then created a corporate governance index by summing up all these dummy variables. The 
higher the value of the index, the greater the number of concomitant corporate governance 
practices in place in the market.  
We also downloaded measures of institutional quality, investor protection and regulatory 
effectiveness from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report and the World 
Bank Governance Indicators (see Appendix A in the Supplementary Materials). 
4.1.7. Market structure and post-trade infrastructure 
As mentioned, we believe that a comprehensive empirical model investigating the 
determinants of cross-border equity inflows should control for market structure and post-
trade infrastructure features. Based on the literature and industry experience, we identified 
the following key characteristics:  
• Direct Market Access (DMA); 
• Securities Lending and Borrowing (SLB); 
• The ability to short-sell; 
• Colocation; 
• Market Making; and 
                                                          
24 Aggarwal et al. (2009) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) consider forbidding or limiting the presence of staggered 
boards as another relevant corporate governance requirement. As most stock exchange in our sample were not 
familiar with this practice (which we understand is a US one), we decided to omit it from our data collection and 
analysis.  
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• The presence of a CCP. 
We then asked stock exchanges to indicate whether, during the January 2006 – April 2018 
period, any of the above features were present in their market, and if so, to provide a brief 
description and indicate for what period. After reviewing the data submissions, we codified 
the information submitted by exchanges and created a dummy variable for each of them. 
4.1.8.  Control variables: market and macroeconomic factors 
As noted in Chan et al. (2005), both economic and stock market development are likely to be 
important determinants of international participation. We therefore include macroeconomic 
indicators and stock market characteristics in our model as control variables.  
We introduce several macroeconomic factors in our specification, namely: domestic real 
interest rate, exchange rate risk, GDP, domestic savings/GDP, domestic debt/GDP, 
exports/GDP. For a list of these variables (including their source), see Appendix A in the 
Supplementary Materials.  
We also control for several stock market characteristics, namely: market capitalisation, 
number of foreign and domestic listed companies, number of listed ETFs, number of listed 
depository receipts. These indicators were either submitted by the exchanges themselves or 
taken from WFE monthly reports. For a list of these variables, see Appendix A in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
4.2. The estimation technique25 
To study the determinants of cross-border flows we estimate a cross-market longitudinal 
regression model. Given the nature of our data, we believe that the most suitable technique 
                                                          
25 This section draws from the methodology section of Alderighi (2018). 
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for such estimation would be within-group regression. Indeed, unobserved heterogeneity is 
very likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables, thus leading to omitted variable 
bias (Wooldridge, 2010) and making both the pooled OLS and the GLS estimators (‘random 
effect’) unsuitable for this kind of study. To support this choice, we firstly compare pooled 
and fixed-effects regression results to show that pooled OLS coefficients would be 
characterised by a high degree of bias. We then perform an Hausman test to assess the 
suitability of the random-effect estimator. The test results show that unobservable 
heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors, therefore making the random-effect 
estimator inconsistent. We provide further detail on this in Appendix C (Supplementary 
Materials).  
Rejecting the null hypothesis in the Hausman test does not make the fixed-effect estimator 
valid. Consistency of the within-group estimator relies indeed on the so-called strict 
exogeneity assumption, that requires regressors to be orthogonal to “all past, current, and 
future innovations” (Mayer, 2016). Although this bias is generally negligible in ‘large T’ 
samples (as the one used for this paper), the problem cannot be simply overlooked on this 
ground, as failure to reject the strict exogeneity hypothesis might invalidate inference even 
in the presence of consistency (Alvarez and Arellano, 2003; Mayer, 2016). Wooldridge (2010) 
proposes a simple test for the strict exogeneity assumption, based on an auxiliary regression 
containing the first leads of a subset of the explanatory variables. Although we are aware of 
the presence of newer (and perhaps more sophisticated) strict exogeneity tests (Mayer, 2016; 
Su et al., 2016), we use Wooldridge’s test because it is straightforward to implement and 
widely accepted. Results are reported in Appendix C (Supplementary Materials). The test 
allows to conclude that strict exogeneity is not a problem in our sample. 
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The use of a ‘large T panel’ with relatively fewer cross sectional units (as typical of macro-
panel data) lead researcher to apply problems that are typically related to time-series analysis 
(such as non-stationarity and cointegration) to the context of longitudinal data (Baltagi and 
Kao, 2000). In particular, concerns might arise that inflows are characterized by a unit root. 
We test for the presence of a unit root in our dependent variables, and strongly reject their 
presence. The test results are commented in Appendix C (Supplementary Materials).  
4.3. Qualitative analyses 
In addition to the reported quantitative analyses, the authors performed qualitative analyses 
to triangulate and support the quantitative results. More in detail, we conducted seven case 
study interviews with stock exchange representatives, and 10 structured interviews with buy-
side investors. While this paper remains quantitative in nature, we believe that the evidence 
gathered through qualitative analyses is valuable and we refer to it either in support of 
theoretical arguments or to complement quantitative results.  
5. Results 
 
5.1. Summary statistics 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
All reported summary statistics are calculated over both the cross sectional and time 
dimensions.  
The average exchange in our sample has a market capitalization of 380 billion USD, a mid-
sized exchange according to the categorization adopted by the World Federation of 
Exchanges (see for example WFE, Median Simple Spread reports, 2017). It has a more than 
564 listed domestic companies, but slightly less than 9 foreign listed companies. To check 
whether our sample is representative of the population of emerging and frontier markets, we 
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assess whether the December 2017 sample means of four different indicators (market 
capitalisation, number of listed companies, value of EOB trades and number of EOB trades) 
are statistically different from their respective population means using standard t-tests. We 
calculate the population means and standard deviations using the full universe of frontier and 
emerging markets as reported in the WFE monthly reports. We find that the sample means 
are not statistically different from the population means at standard confidence levels. We 
repeat this exercise for June 2012 (mid-point) and January 2006, finding the same result. 
These findings (reported in Section D of the supplementary materials) suggest that our sample 
is representative of the population of emerging and frontier exchanges.  
In line with the trends reported in the introduction, submitting exchanges saw positive cross 
border equity inflows over the sample period. According to our estimations, the mean 
monthly inflows towards the markets in our sample were 70.10 million USD, ranging from an 
outflow of 6.5 billion dollars (minimum) to an inflow of nearly 13 billion USD (maximum). 
Mean quarterly inflows were 205.96 million USD (minimum: -11 billion USD; maximum: 13 
billion USD), semi-annual 400.86 million USD (minimum: -13 billion USD; maximum: 15 billion 
USD), and annual ones 800.82 million USD (minimum: -19 billion USD; maximum: 23 billion 
USD). Total cumulative inflows towards the exchanges in the sample amounted to over 160 
billion USD over the January 2006 - April 2018 period. We also note that 15 out of 20 
exchanges (75% of our cross-sectional units) were characterised by positive cumulative and 
average inflows over the same period. As evident from Figure 1 below, after a rapid initial 
surge at the beginning of our sample period, capitals outflew of emerging markets due to the 
financial crisis, to surge again in the early 2010s. Recent years saw slowdown of capital 
inflows. Figure 2 shows that cumulative annual inflows for the same subsample of markets 
follow the same pattern as World Bank/IMF data (the two series show a correlation of 
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93.35%), confirming that our sample is representative of the population of emerging and 
frontier economies.  
Figure 1: Cumulative monthly inflows, Jan 2006-April 2018 
Note: includes only data from exchanges that submitted international trading data for the whole January 2006 
– April 2018 period, namely: Amman Stock Exchange, Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX), BSE India Limited, 
Colombo Stock Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, 
Moscow Exchange, National Stock Exchange of India, Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Taipei Exchange, The Egyptian 
Exchange, The Stock Exchange of Thailand. The vertical dashed bars indicate the start and the end of the financial 
crisis, lasting from September 2008 to April 2009 as indicated in Barrot et al. (2016). 
Figure 2: Annual inflows, 2006–2017 
Note: includes only data from exchanges that submitted international trading data for the whole January 2006 
– April 2018 period, namely: Amman Stock Exchange, Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX), BSE India Limited, 
Colombo Stock Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, 
Moscow Exchange, National Stock Exchange of India, Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Taipei Exchange, The Egyptian 
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Exchange, The Stock Exchange of Thailand. World Bank data: cross border equity inflows towards middle - and 
low-income countries. Correlation between the two series: 93.35%. 
5.2. Main results 
 
5.2.1.  Cross-border equity inflows: pushed or pulled? 
We firstly analyse whether cross-border equity inflows depend on foreign (“pushed”) or local 
market performances (“pulled”). Results are displayed in Table 2. To draw conclusions on 
which factors are more relevant in explaining the dependent variable, we compare a model 
where we control for baseline macroeconomic indicators and market characteristics only 
(Column (1)) with models where we add push and pull factors respectively (Columns (4) and 
(5)). We then add both push and pull factors at the same time (Column (6)) to see whether 
the significance of one set of factors affects the significance of the other when considered 
together.  
In fact, the specification in Column (1) is nested in the specifications of Column (4) and (5) 
respectively. Therefore, we can test whether the vectors of additional coefficients (that is, 
either the push or the pull factors added in Columns (4) and (5)) are jointly significantly 
different from zero using Likelihood Ratio tests. We find that both push and pull factors are 
significant contributors to the model’s variance, as the null hypothesis that the non-restricted 
model is equal to the restricted one is rejected at the 1% level for both LR tests. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of pull factors increases the adjusted R-squared of the model significantly 
more than the introduction of push factors: on average, pull factors account for 7.8% of the 
models’ adjusted R-squared, as opposed to 3.5% for push factors. In addition, we note that 
both the AIC and the BIC are lower for the model containing pull factors than the one for the 
model containing push factors. This evidence suggests that pull factors matter relatively more 
in explaining the dependent variable. 
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Among push factors, we note that returns on the FTSE100 and on the S&P500 indices have a 
positive and significant influence on equity inflows. This suggests that domestic and 
international asset managers who invest in UK and US indices tend to invest more towards 
emerging economies when UK and US market conditions are more favourable (the so-called 
“wealth effect”), although the significance of US returns disappears in Column (6). A one-
percentage point increase in returns on the FTSE100 index is associated with an inflow 
increase of 18.41 million USD, roughly 25.8% of the average monthly inflow in the sample. 
These results are consistent with the wealth-effect explanation put forward by Griffin et al. 
(2004) and Richards (2005). We note however that neither the correlation between local and 
foreign returns, nor US/global uncertainty (as proxied by the VIX index) have a significant 
influence on inflows, despite the signs of the coefficients are overall consistent with our 
expectations. These results (confirmed in the robustness checks section) suggest that push 
factors have relatively little importance in explaining equity inflows in our sample.26  
The fact that push factors have little importance in explaining inflows is in contrast with the 
literature, which finds that US returns (Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005), US stock market 
volatility (Aron et al., 2010; Ghosh et al., 2014) and the correlation between domestic and 
foreign returns (Coeurdacier and Guibaud, 2011) are significant determinants of inflows. We 
believe this result might be due to the increasing international breadth of indices commonly 
used to estimate the relevance of push factors, such as the FTSE100 or the S&P500. On one 
                                                          
26 Note that in the main models, we introduce US, UK and EU returns (and the respective correlations with the 
domestic market) as proxied by returns on the: Dow Jones, FTSE100 and CAC40 respectively. We swap the CAC40 
with the DAX and the Dow Jones with the S&P500 in a robustness check. Similarly, in the main models we 
introduce returns on the MSCI Indices and swap them with returns on the FTSE EM index in a robustness check. 
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hand, these indices nowadays are a looser indication of the performance of local economies, 
as they in fact give exposure to a wider range of countries, including emerging markets 
themselves.27 On the other hand, these indices are largely held and traded by local and 
international investors, henceforth returns on these indices do in fact benefit both.28 We 
therefore argue that the relevance of push factors as determinants of inflows is somewhat 
trickier to estimate than in the past, and perhaps not well-captured by the returns or volatility 
of these indices. Future research should assess more in detail both the levels of international 
exposure given by large local indices and the international spread of those who invest in them. 
The concept of “push factors” and the estimation of their relevance should be revised in the 
light of such an assessment.  
On the pull side, we note that “contemporaneous” domestic returns have a statistically 
significant positive influence (at the 5% level) on monthly inflows.29 A one-percentage point 
increase in domestic returns is associated with a 24.4 USD million increase in monthly inflows 
(domestic returns coefficient in Columns (6)), roughly 35% of the average monthly inflows in 
the sample. This suggests that domestic returns account for an important part of monthly 
inflows, consistently with the return-chasing hypothesis and the empirical evidence on the 
                                                          
27 This concept emerged quite clearly from conversations with buy-side investors. See also 
www.sharesmagazine.co.uk/article/a-safer-way-to-get-international-exposure, 
www.schroders.com/en/uk/private-investor/insights/markets/how-the-ftse-100-has-changed-over-33-years/ 
28 See www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2016. 
29 The concept of “contemporaneous returns” cannot fully apply when using monthly data, as discussed in Griffin 
et al. (2004), and we acknowledge the well-known limitations of using low-frequency data. Yet, we decided to 
use contemporaneous returns in our regressions as the literature shows that the influence of returns on inflows 
decays quite quickly (Griffin et al., 2004).  
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topic (Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Edison and Warnock, 2008; Griffin et al., 2004; Richards, 2005).  
According to our results, domestic volatility also has a statistically significant negative 
influence on monthly inflows, but only at the 10% level. A one-percent increase in domestic 
volatility is associated with a decrease in inflows equal to 9.5 million USD. This result suggests 
that foreign capitals tend to be repatriated in periods of higher market turmoil, a 
phenomenon colloquially referred to as “flights to safety” or “flights to quality” in the industry 
environment.  
We also find that returns on the MSCI EM Index are a significant predictor of monthly inflows 
(at the 10% only, but throughout all specifications), even when controlling for domestic 
returns (Richards, 2005). Note, as expected, that the coefficients of MSCI EM and FM returns 
are sensibly lower when domestic returns are controlled for (compare Columns (5) and (6)). 
Possibly, this result is driven by the rise of passive investment strategies which would not 
differentiate between specific emerging markets but would consider them as part of the index 
portfolio (EBRD and IPREO, 2018). The coefficient of MSCI EM returns is sizable: a one-
percentage point increase in returns on the MSCI Index is associated with an inflow increase 
of 16.47 million USD, roughly 23.3% of the average monthly inflow in the sample. 
On control variables, we note that macroeconomic factors overall show the correct signs, but 
no statistical significance: debt over GDP and real interest rate show a negative correlation 
with inflows (see Aron et al., (2010)), as well as exports over GDP. This latter result is 
consistent with the fact that positive capital inflows imply a negative trade balance from an 
accounting perspective. In addition, GDP growth and larger domestic savings over GDP are 
(as expected) associated with higher inflows. The lack of statistical significance can perhaps 
be attributed to the nature of our data: most of these indicators are indeed observed at a 
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quarterly (GDP) or annual frequency (savings, exports, debt), and therefore show low within-
group variation. This notoriously inflates the standard errors of the within-group estimator 
(Allison, 2010), in turn potentially leading to a lack of statistical significance. 
Finally, we note that most market characteristics also show the correct sign, but only the 
coefficient of domestic listed companies is statistically different from zero.30 A larger pool of 
domestic companies is associated with larger inflows, suggesting that international investors 
value local diversification opportunities.31 Ten additional companies listed on the market are 
associated with larger monthly inflows by 5.6 million USD.  
5.2.2. Cross-border equity inflows: additional levers 
We explore the relevance of additional country-specific levers in influencing cross-border 
flows. We use the specification of Table 2, Column (6) as our baseline model, and add different 
sets of levers discreetly, following an approach similar to Chan et al. (2005). Results are 
displayed in Table 3.   
The specification of Table 2, Column (6) is nested in the specifications displayed in Columns 
(1) to (5) in Table 3. We therefore perform LR tests to assess whether the introduction of the 
levers adds explanatory power to the dependent variable. We find that this is the case 
throughout all specifications: the null hypothesis that the unrestricted model is equal to the 
restricted model is rejected at the 1% level for the addiction of: explicit barriers to investment, 
                                                          
30 Regressing foreign buys and sales on a set of market characteristics shows that market characteristics have an 
overall similar influence on buys and sells, suggesting that more sizable, liquid markets stimulate trading activity 
overall. The fact that these indicators have a similar influence on both buys and sells can explain the lack of 
statistical significance in the inflows model. Results are available upon request.  
31 Conversations with buy-side investors strongly support this finding.  
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corporate governance and market infrastructure features, and at the 5% for the remaining 
additions. The information criteria are minimised for the model containing explicit barriers to 
investment, followed by the one controlling for corporate governance standards, suggesting 
these two sets of factors are the most important in explaining cross-border flows. It is worth 
noting however that the adjusted R-squared and the information criteria are very similar 
across specifications, suggesting that each of the additions matters more or less equally in 
explaining cross-border flows. 
We find that explicit barriers to investment and local market frictions hamper foreign inflows 
(Column (1)). A country introducing capital inflows restrictions sees a reduction in inflows 
equal to 302 million USD over the sample period. This is result is consistent with the literature 
(Chan et al., 2005). Similarly, the presence of capital gain taxes has a negative correlation with 
inflows, although significant only at the 10% level: a country introducing capital gain taxes 
sees a reduction in monthly inflows equal to 317 million USD over the sample period. The 
presence of stump duties also matters: a country introducing stamp duties on financial 
securities sees a reduction in monthly inflows equal to 158 million USD over the January 2006-
April 2018 period. The correlation is significant at the 1% level.32  
Reducing information costs is found to have a sizable long-run influence on inflows, although 
the statistical significance of the related coefficients is mild (Column (2)). Adhering to IFRS 
standards is associated with a statistically significant increase in inflows (at the 10% level) by 
183 million USD. After inclusion in the MSCI Emerging Market Index, a market can attract 
                                                          
32 We introduced all identified explicit barriers in the econometric model, but a few of them were discarded 
because of collinearity, namely: capital repatriation restrictions, sectorial restrictions and presence of different 
share class for international investors.  
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roughly 350 million USD inflows in the long run (the coefficient is statistically significant at the 
10% level). Recommending disclosure in English is also found to brings slightly less than 150 
million USD in the long-run (the relation is significant at the 10% level).  
We find that institutional quality, rule of low and political stability do not influence monthly 
inflows, although all variables have the expected sign (Column (3)). This lack of significance 
might be attributed, similarly to macroeconomic factors, to the low within-group volatility of 
these annual indicators (Allison, 2010). 
According to our empirical results (see Column (4)) better corporate governance practices 
attract foreign inflows, consistently with the literature (Dahlquist et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 
2009) . While inflows are not perfectly monotonic in the number of requirements in place, 
markets introducing a high number of concomitant requirements (five or six) manage to 
attract the highest inflows in the long run. Introducing one single requirement is associated 
with a long-run increase in inflows by almost 519 million USD (significant at the 5% level). 
Introducing five requirements is associated with a long-run equity inflow of almost 600 billion 
USD (significant at the 5% level). A market introducing the full set of considered requirements 
is found to attract foreign inflows as high as 756 million in the long-run (significant at the 1% 
level). 33   
With respect to market structure and post-trade infrastructure features, we find that only the 
introduction of SLB has a positive and statistically significant relation at the 10% level (Column 
                                                          
33 These results are pretty much consistent with interviews with buy-side investors, who largely declared that 
they value the most the ability to move capitals in and out of the country, rule of law and certainty of 
enforcement, and corporate governance standards. Removing information cost barriers is overall seen as 
something that is “nice to have” but not crucial for their investment decision.  
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(5)). We conclude that market structure features are not preponderant determinants of cross-
border equity flows.  
5.3. Endogeneity 
It must be kept in mind that, in addition to the cited literature on the determinants of the 
home/foreign bias and international capital flows, there is an equally important literature on 
the consequences of foreign participation and trading on the domestic market that often 
focuses on the same indicators. For example, while international investors are attracted by 
better corporate governance practices (Leuz et al., 2009), they are also found to enhance 
corporate governance standards in the domestic market (Aggarwal et al., 2011). As 
documented, foreign investors prefer higher domestic returns, as well as more liquid and less 
volatile stocks; in turn, however, foreign participation has an influence on stock trading and 
stock market liquidity, volatility, prices (Errunza, 2001; Han Kim and Singal, 2000; Li et al., 
2011; Rhee and Wang, 2009; Wang, 2007). We believe that most estimations proposed in the 
literature, and ours makes no exception, should acknowledge that regression and estimation 
results would be biased because of simultaneity, i.e. foreign investors are attracted by certain 
characteristics that are in turn influenced by international participation and trading. Tackling 
endogeneity problems with appropriate techniques (for example, policy evaluation analyses) 
is a task for future research.  
5.4. Robustness checks 
We perform a number of robustness checks, to assess the resilience of our results to changes 
in the specification and/or the sample.34  
                                                          
34 Results available upon request. 
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To start with, we perform our analyses excluding three markets in which international 
investors face more limited exchange rate risk: ATHEX (as Greece is in the Eurozone), Dubai 
Financial Market (as the UAE Dirham is pegged to the USD) and Amman Stock Exchange (as 
the Jordanian Dinar is also pegged to the USD). One can express concern that inflows towards 
these three markets could drive the overall results. When considering push and pull factors, 
the results are comparable to the main ones, with the exception that domestic volatility has 
a slightly weaker statistical influence, while returns on the MSCI frontier market index acquire 
statistical significance: a one percentage point increase in the index is associated with a 16 
million USD increase in inflows (significant at the 5% level). When considering levers and 
interventions, the results are overall comparable to the main ones.  
We are conscious that our measure of portfolio inflows contains large purchases, often 
considered FDIs (Aron et al., 2010). As a robustness check, we exclude large trades from our 
sample. Unfortunately, we don’t observe trade sizes. To exclude large trades, we therefore 
calculate the average trade size, relative to the local market capitalisation. Formally: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑘 =
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
 (3) 
Where k = buy, sell. We then exclude observations for which the average trade size (for both 
buys and sells) is larger than the 95th and the 90th percentile of the sample distribution. The 
estimations convey similar results, suggesting that the main results are not driven by the 
presence of large trades. 
We exclude the financial crisis from our estimations, as a factor potentially driving the results. 
In a simple check, we just exclude all observations prior to 2010 to estimate all models in the 
post-crisis period, obtaining comparable results. We however note that the coefficient of 
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MSCI EM and FM returns are considerably more sizable (a one-percentage point increase in 
returns on the MSCI EM index is associated with an inflow increase of 27.24 million USD) and 
show greater statistical significance than in Tables 2 and 3. This suggests that, after the crisis, 
the importance of index-tracking investment strategies might have increased. In a separate 
check we exclude the crisis period indicated in Barrot et al. (2016) (September 2008 to April 
2009) and find comparable results to the main ones. 
We estimate all models by substituting the returns on the MSCI EM and FM markets indices 
with the returns on the FTSE emerging markets index. Returns on the FTSE EM index are 
positive and significant at the 5% level. This result confirms that investors’ sentiment based 
on widely recognised tracking index is an important determinant of cross-border inflows. We 
then estimate all models by substituting returns on the Dow Jones with returns on the S&P500 
and returns on the CAC40 with returns on the DAX index, finding comparable results. 
We estimate all models by substituting the VIX index with volatility scores for the FTSE100, 
the Dow Jones and the CAC40 indices. We find comparable results. In addition, we find that 
volatility on the FTSE100 index has a negative and significant relation with inflows, reinforcing 
the idea that better market conditions in London stimulate inflows towards emerging 
markets.  
One might argue that push factors would be better captured by macroeconomic variables, 
such as yield or interest rate differentials between the US and the domestic market (Ahmed, 
2017; Yang, 2016). We introduce the US policy interest rate in the regression and find that it 
doesn’t have a negative correlation with inflows. We substitute this variable with the interest 
rate differential between the US and the domestic market (and remove domestic real interest 
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rate from the regression models) and find no significant relation. This result is in line with 
(Ahmed, 2017, Table 3) but in contrast with (Yang, 2016). 
Finally, we run our models using inflows weighted by the lag of market capitalisation as a 
dependent variable, as found in Griffin et al. (2004) and Edison and Warnock (2008). On the 
pull side, we find that domestic returns have a strong relation with inflows (with the correct 
sign). On the push side, we find a significant negative correlation of the VIX index. On the 
levers side, we find comparable results, although the influence of corporate governance 
requirements is somewhat weaker. This is expected, though, as better governance standards 
benefit domestic investors as well, and are likely to be positively related to market 
capitalisation, the denominator of the dependent variable. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we empirically assess the determinants of cross-border equity flows towards 
emerging and frontier markets. In accordance with the literature, we firstly study the 
relevance of push and pull factors in explaining inflows. We find that cross-border flows are 
mostly “pulled” by better domestic market performance (higher domestic market returns and 
lower domestic volatility).  We find however that push factors matter relatively less in 
explaining international equity flows.  
We then assess whether several levers and interventions are good predictors of cross-border 
flows. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that explicit barriers to investment keep investors out 
of the market, while stricter corporate governance requirements are positively related to 
foreign equity investment. Reducing information barriers is associated with sizable inflows 
but matters relatively in terms of statistical significance. We find weak or no support that 
market structure and post-trade infrastructure features are associated with larger inflows. 
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We provide a few hints for future research. Firstly, we believe that the lack of significance on 
the push factors’ side deserves proper attention. Nowadays, important advanced market 
indices, such as the FTSE100, are characterised by an international breadth that partly unties 
them from their local economies. Therefore, considering returns on these indices “push 
factors” could be misleading. As a matter of fact, these indices give a weaker indication than 
in the past of both local market performance (because of their international exposure) and 
the returns enjoyed by local investors (because of the international participation in these 
indices). This can explain why according to our estimations push factor matter relatively less 
than pull ones in explaining inflows. Future research should assess more in detail the levels of 
international exposure given by large international indices, as well the international spread 
of their investors. The concept of “push factors” and the estimation of their relevance in the 
context of cross-border equity flows should be revised in the light of such assessments.  
On a more technical side, we acknowledge that our estimations are affected by simultaneity 
bias: for example, as much as foreign investors are attracted by less volatile markets, they 
also are found to contribute to price stabilisation. Future research should estimate models 
that allow to perform casual inference, to assess the casual effect of these levers and 
interventions on inflows. Empirical models can for example apply instrumental variable 
estimations or use policy evaluation techniques such as difference-in-differences regressions. 
Finally, we believe that future research should study more in detail the determinants of 
foreign trading activity, a phenomenon that, albeit related, we have found to be driven by 
different factors from cross-border inflows.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Mean Std. dev Median Min Max 
Inflows (million USD)      
Monthly 70.10 836.91 6.27 -6507.64 12990.09 
Quarterly 205.96 1636.67 22.45 -11306.73 13640.99 
Semi-annual 400.86 2598.17 70.95 -12443.43 15568.90 
Annual 800.82 4226.63 177.74 -19110.53 23784.42 
Debt/GDP (%) 57.79 32.84 52.69 6.70 199.06 
Savings/GDP (%) 22.40 8.59 22.10 4.11 40.40 
Exports/GDP (%) 39.55 24.12 29.85 7.09 97.19 
GDP growth (%) 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.54 0.35 
Real interest rate 0.07 0.74 0.11 -5.45 4.06 
Market capitalization (billion 
USD) 
380.82 471.96 130.46 2.63 2404.84 
# foreign listed companies 8.57 17.47 1.00 0.00 87.00 
# domestic listed companies 564.82 982.17 275.00 29.00 5985.00 
# ETFs 9.22 15.06 2.00 0.00 99.00 
# DRs 4.50 18.29 0.00 0.00 147.00 
Monthly domestic returns 
(%) 
0.44 6.53 0.73 -40.38 35.16 
Monthly domestic volatility 
(%) 
1.14 1.13 0.92 0.15 40.56 
Foreign returns (%)      
CAC40 0.20 4.63 0.35 -14.52 11.83 
DAX 0.63 5.18 1.13 -21.31 15.50 
FTSE100 0.23 3.67 0.77 -13.95 8.11 
Dow Jones 0.70 3.73 0.80 -15.15 9.12 
S&P500 0.68 3.87 1.10 -18.56 10.23 
Foreign volatility (%)      
CAC40 1.26 0.63 1.14 0.41 5.17 
DAX 1.22 0.60 1.12 0.40 4.91 
FTSE 0.99 0.54 0.86 0.27 4.85 
Dow Jones 0.89 0.57 0.72 0.20 4.81 
S&P500 0.95 0.63 0.77 0.26 5.04 
Correl. domestic/foreign 
returns (%): 
     
      
CAC40 0.36 0.34 0.43 -0.70 0.96 
DAX 0.37 0.35 0.44 -0.78 0.95 
FTSE100 0.39 0.33 0.44 -0.74 0.94 
Dow Jones 0.36 0.33 0.41 -0.81 0.96 
S&P500 0.40 0.33 0.47 -0.72 0.96 
EM Returns - MSCI Index 
(%) 
0.34 6.50 0.49 -32.16 15.41 
FM Returns - MSCI Index 
(%) 
-0.20 5.27 0.42 -28.67 16.61 
EM returns - FTSE Index (%) 0.34 6.49 0.70 -32.90 16.16 
Ownership restrictions - 
foreign investors 
0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Capital inflow restrictions 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Capital gain tax present 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Dividend tax present 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Stamp duty present 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Corporate governance index 
(1-6) 
3.31 1.59 3.00 0.00 6.00 
Disclosure in English 
compulsory 
0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Disclosure in English 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 45 
 
recommended 
Inclusion MSCI EM Index 0.66 0.47 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Inclusion MSCI FM Index 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Adherence to IFRS standards 0.64 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Co-location present 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Short-selling present 0.57 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00 
SLB present 0.62 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Market making present 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DMA present 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 
CCP 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Observations 2248     
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Table 2: Are cross border equity flows pushed or pulled? 
Fixed-effect estimator (within-groups linear regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic returns - 2429.109*** - 2427.407*** - 2437.225*** 
  (809.609)  (817.776)  (813.592) 
       
Domestic volatility - -751.695* - -952.517* - -949.867* 
  (410.654)  (482.206)  (498.209) 
       
EM Returns (MSCI 
Index) 
- 1956.465* - 1993.835* - 1687.473* 
  (1032.498)  (1128.232)  (934.568) 
       
FM Returns (MSCI 
Index) 
- 423.954 - 310.040 - 324.376 
  (458.161)  (584.351)  (566.003) 
       
Foreign returns       
CAC40 - - 374.412 - -653.227 -582.468 
   (825.796)  (760.304) (801.890) 
       
FTSE100 - - 3180.123** - 3885.827** 1811.835** 
   (1191.837)  (1658.991) (845.140) 
       
Dow Jones - - 1269.805** - 1384.443* -641.200 
   (584.603)  -653.227 (898.797) 
Correlation 
domestic/foreign 
returns 
      
CAC40 - - 101.977 - -74.338 -76.655 
   (65.297)  (71.249) (71.570) 
       
FTSE100 - - -104.888 - -112.057 -121.874 
   (152.309)  (124.817) (117.689) 
       
Dow Jones - - -23.602 - 2.175 14.863 
   (98.249)  (75.824) (71.785) 
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VIX - - -1.625 - -2.966 -0.997 
   (2.186)  (3.733) (4.045) 
       
Constant -408.646 93.099*** 112.822*** -305.125 -141.194 -211.488 
 (389.268) (20.170) (34.543) (356.564) (373.074) (361.168) 
       
Macroeconomic 
Indicators  
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Market characteristics  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Seasonality  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year Effects  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
R-square (within) 0.057 0.101 0.049 0.135 0.095 0.139 
R-square (between) 0.002 0.024 0.015 0.023 0.022 0.035 
Adjusted R-square 0.041 0.099 0.046 0.119 0.076 0.120 
Number of markets 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 
Average T 112.400 112.450 112.550 112.400 112.400 112.400 
Observations 2248.000 2249.000 2251.000 2248.000 2248.000 2248.000 
Heteroscedasticity-robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Macroeconomic factors include: nominal GDP growth, debt/GDP, 
exports/GDP, domestic savings/GDP, real interest rate, standard deviation of exchange rates against local currency (USD, EUR, GBP). Market characteristics include: number 
of foreign listed companies, number of domestic listed companies, number of ETFs, number of depository receipts, market capitalization (second-order polynomial).  
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Table 3: Levers and interventions 
Fixed-effect estimator (within-groups linear regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Explicit barriers 
to investment 
Institutional 
quality 
Corporate 
governance 
Information costs Market 
infrastructure 
features 
      
Ownership restrictions 
- foreign investors 
-41.143 - - - - 
 (69.610)     
      
Capital inflow 
restrictions 
-302.605*** - - - - 
 (91.172)     
      
Capital gain tax present -317.179* - - - - 
 (155.281)     
      
Dividend tax present 25.187 - - - - 
 (107.385)     
      
Stamp duty present -158.373*** - - - - 
 (54.435)     
      
Disclosure in English: 
 
     
Compulsory - 90.740 - - - 
  (79.827)    
      
Recommended - 148.511* - - - 
  (80.538)    
      
Inclusion MSCI Index: 
 
     
Emerging - 349.340* - - - 
  (195.400)    
      
Frontier - 261.927 - - - 
  (186.511)    
      
Adherence to IFRS 
standards 
- 183.622* - - - 
  (91.321)    
      
Sound local market 
regulation 
- - 19.838 - - 
   (64.469)   
      
Political stability - - 1.443 - - 
   (2.685)   
      
Corruption - - -10.139 - - 
   (11.590)   
      
Strength Investors' 
protection 
- - - 23.255 - 
    (74.832)  
      
Strength audit reports - - - -119.143 - 
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    (93.481)  
      
Efficacy of corporate 
boards 
- - - 60.510 - 
    (118.867)  
Corporate governance 
requirements in place: 
     
One - - - 518.920** - 
    (208.113)  
      
Two - - - 531.135*** - 
    (160.821)  
      
Three - - - 492.998** - 
    (199.264)  
      
Four - - - 417.349 - 
    (248.876)  
      
Five - - - 599.693** - 
    (226.392)  
      
Six - - - 756.187*** - 
    (255.379)  
      
Co-location present - - - - -60.440 
     (195.221) 
      
Short-selling present - - - - 171.282 
     (129.461) 
      
SLB present - - - - 182.499* 
     (103.873) 
      
Market making present - - - - -57.959 
     (70.052) 
      
DMA present - - - - 234.725 
     (198.987) 
      
CCP present - - - - 89.411 
     (140.978) 
      
      
Constant -97.701 72.054 -1021.224 -692.944* -603.895* 
 (383.356) (492.761) (898.322) (362.485) (319.267) 
      
Seasonality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Macroeconomic 
Indicators 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Market characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pull factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Push factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square (within) 0.145 0.143 0.142 0.148 0.146 
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R-square (between) 0.107 0.008 0.061 0.008 0.002 
Adjusted R-square 0.124 0.122 0.121 0.12 0.124 
Number of markets 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 
Average T 112.400 112.400 107.450 112.400 112.400 
Observations 2248.000 2248.000 2149.000 2248.000 2248.000 
Heteroscedasticity-robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Macroeconomic factors include: nominal GDP growth, debt/GDP, exports/GDP, domestic savings/GDP, real 
interest rate, standard deviation of exchange rates against local currency (USD, EUR, GBP). Market 
characteristics include: number of foreign listed companies, number of domestic listed companies, number of 
ETFs, number of depository receipts, market capitalization (second-order polynomial). Pull factors include: 
domestic returns, domestic volatility. Push factors include: foreign returns (FTSE100, CAC40, Dow Jones), 
foreign volatility (VIX Index), correlation between domestic and foreign returns (FTSE100, CAC40, Dow Jones). 
 
Supplementary materials 
A. List of external indicators  
Indicators obtained from WFE monthly reports: 
• Market capitalisation (monthly, current USD millions) 
• Value of share trading (monthly, current USD millions) 
• Number of trades in shares (monthly, thousands) 
• Turnover velocity (monthly, percentage) 
• Number of domestic listed companies (monthly, full number) 
• Number of foreign listed companies (monthly, full number) 
• Number of listed ETFs (monthly, full number) 
Indicators obtained from external sources: 
• MSCI Index, FTSE EM Index (daily, full number): Thomson Reuters 
• Broad market index (daily, full number): Thomson Reuters 
• Blue-chip Index (daily, full number): Thomson Reuters 
• Exchange rates, local currency against USD, EUR, GBP (daily, full number): Thomson 
Reuters 
• CPI (monthly): Thomson Reuters Datastream TRICE 
• Policy interest rate (monthly): Thomson Reuters Datastream TRICE, IMF 
• Political stability (annual, 0-100 scale): World Bank Governance Indicators 
• Control of corruption (annual, 0-100 scale): World Bank Governance Indicators 
• Regulatory quality (annual, 0-100 scale): World Bank Governance Indicators 
• Ease of financing through local equity market(s)  (annual, 1-7 scale): World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
• Sound of local equity market regulation (annual, 1-7 scale): World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
• Debt over GDP ( annual, percentage): World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
• Domestic savings over GDP (annual, percentage): World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report  
• Exports over GDP (annual, percentage): World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report  
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• GDP (annual, billion current PPP USD): World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
• Strength of investors’ protection (annual, 1-7 scale): World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
• Strength of audit and disclosure reports (annual, 1-7 scale): World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report  
• Protection of minority shareholders (annual, 1-7 scale): World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 
• Inclusion of a country in the MSCI EM and FM Indices (dummy): MSCI 
 
B. Sanity checks for constructed variables 
 
Table B1: correlation between share of market capitalisation and equity inflows (boldfaced) 
 (1)     
 Foreign share 
of market cap  
Monthly 
inflow  
Quarterly 
inflow  
Semi-annual 
inflow  
Annual inflow  
Foreign share of 
market cap 
1 - - - - 
Monthly inflow  0.176 1 - - - 
Quarterly inflow  0.332*** 0.563*** 1 - - 
Semi-annual inflow  0.411*** 0.355*** 0.665*** 1 - 
Annual inflow 0.462*** 0.243** 0.482*** 0.720*** 1 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure B1: Share of market capitalisation and annual equity inflows for a selected exchange
Note. Correlation between the two measures: 46.2% 
  Table B2: correlation between returns correlation and market instability (boldfaced) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Correlation 
domestic/forei
gn returns: 
CAC40 FTSE100 DAX Dow Jones S&P 500 
VIX Domestic 
volatility 
Correlation 
domestic/forei
gn returns: 
       
CAC40 1       
FTSE100 0.820*** 1      
DAX 0.916*** 0.792*** 1     
Dow Jones 0.748*** 0.724*** 0.745*** 1    
S&P500 0.785*** 0.754*** 0.791*** 0.968*** 1   
VIX 0.310*** 0.300*** 0.268*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 1  
Domestic 
volatility 
0.211*** 0.206*** 0.184*** 0.162*** 0.176*** 0.320*** 1 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure B2: time series plot of the in-house volatility measure and the MOEX Volatility Index 
Note. Correlation between the two measures: 86.82% 
 
Figure B3: time series plot of the in-house volatility measure and the JSE Volatility Index 
Note. Correlation between the two measures: 89.15% 
 
 
 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
5
5
1
0
9
1
6
3
2
1
7
2
7
1
3
2
5
3
7
9
4
3
3
4
8
7
5
4
1
5
9
5
6
4
9
7
0
3
7
5
7
8
1
1
8
6
5
9
1
9
9
7
3
1
0
2
7
1
0
8
1
1
1
3
5
1
1
8
9
1
2
4
3
1
2
9
7
1
3
5
1
1
4
0
5
1
4
5
9
1
5
1
3
1
5
6
7
1
6
2
1
In
-h
o
u
se
 V
o
la
ti
lit
y 
M
ea
su
re
JS
E 
V
o
la
ti
lit
y 
In
d
ex
Proposed volatility measure and JSE volatility Index
In-house Volatility Measure JSE Volatility Index
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0
50
100
150
200
250
In
-h
o
u
se
 V
o
la
ti
lit
y 
M
ea
su
re
M
O
EX
 V
o
la
ti
lit
y 
In
d
ex
Proposed volatility measure and MOEX volatility Index
MOEX Volatility Index In-house Volatility Measure
 54 
 
C. Sanity checks for the application of the within-group estimator 
Bias in pooled OLS estimator and Hausman test: To support the choice of the fixed-effect 
estimator, we compare and contrast pooled OLS and within-group estimation results using 
the specification of Table 2, Column (6). We find that the within-group regression model 
coefficients substantially differ from the pooled OLS ones, suggesting that estimating the 
model without controlling for fixed effects would lead to bias in the estimates. We don’t 
observe any abnormal behaviour in terms of standard errors, hinting that the regressors have 
overall satisfactory levels of intra-group volatility (Allison, 2009). We also compare and 
contrast the random and the fixed effect results using a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). 
Under the Hausman test’s null hypothesis, unobservable heterogeneity is uncorrelated with 
the regressors, a situation in which the random effect model would be preferred over the 
fixed effect one on the ground of efficiency. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level, 
concluding that the random effect model is not an appropriate technique.35  
Strict exogeneity: As mentioned in Section 4.2, we test for the presence of strict exogeneity 
using the procedure found in Wooldridge (2012). We follow Felbermayr and Jung (2009) and 
use a standard F-test to check the joint significance of all leads. One might argue that the test 
results are dependent on the choice of the leaded regressors in the subsample. We show that 
this is not the case for our estimations by running several tests, using different subsamples of 
leaded regressors. Table C1 contains the test results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Results available upon request.  
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Table C1: Wooldridge’s tests of strict exogeneity 
P-values of F-tests on the coefficients of the leaded regressors 
 (1) 
Dependent variable Monthly 
inflow 
  
Subsample 1 (3 
random regressors) 
0.48 
  
Subsample 2 (7 
random regressors) 
0.46 
  
Subsample 3 (5 
random regressors) 
0.92 
  
Subsample 4 (6 
random regressors) 
0.18 
  
The baseline specification for the tests is that of Table 1, Column (6). 
We also note that the coefficients of the lead regressors are not individually significant in all 
specifications. We conclude that strict exogeneity is not an issue in our estimations. 
Stationarity: As mentioned in 4.2, concerns might arise that the dependent variable is 
characterised by a unit root. If so, regression results might be the result spurious correlations. 
Therefore, we take care of checking that the dependent variable does not follow a unit root 
process.  
Preliminary analyses of individual time series allow to (visually) conjecture that this would not 
be a source of concern in our database. Patterns suggesting stationarity like the one shown 
in Figure C1 below are common across almost all stock exchanges in the sample. 
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Figure C1: Time series plot of monthly inflows for two exchanges in our sample 
Estimation of AR(p) models on the individual time series hints that the processes are largely 
stationary, and that autocorrelation should not go, on average, far beyond the 3rd order. 
Consistently, we perform GLS augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Elliott et al., 1996) for each 
market, setting five as a maximum number of lags, and in a vast majority of exchanges we are 
able to reject the presence of a unit root for both variables.  
We finally implement a Fisher test to detect the presence of a unit root in panel data (Maddala 
and Wu, 1999). We choose this test because it can be used in presence of unbalanced panels, 
and because research has demonstrated it is more powerful than other well-established 
procedures, such as the IPS test (Baltagi and Kao, 2000; Im et al., 2003). We use the 
demeaning procedure introduced by Levin et al. (Levin et al., 2002) to control for possible 
correlation across cross-sectional units. We set the number of lags to three consistently with 
the results described above, but the result below are robust to changes in the number of lags. 
We are able to reject the null hypothesis that all panels have a unit root for the dependent 
variable. The null is rejected at the 1% level.  
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D. Representativeness of the sample 
Table D1: Z-tests  
Indicator Sample 
mean 
Sample size Population 
Mean 
Population 
SD 
Z-value Cumulative 
prob. 
p-value Date 
Market cap       
520,000.00  
20               
416,068.58  
       
915,509.41  
0.508 69.42% 30.58% Dec-17 
Value traded          
19,800.00  
20                 
21,806.97  
          
94,673.95  
-0.095 46.22% 53.78% Dec-17 
# of trades          
16,933.42  
20                 
16,296.29  
          
50,589.62  
0.056 52.25% 47.75% Dec-17 
Listed comp.                
711.11  
20                       
421.75  
                
833.50  
1.553 93.97% 6.03% Dec-17 
Market cap       
389,000.00  
18               
393,723.24  
       
511,868.74  
-0.039 48.44% 51.56% Jun-12 
Value traded          
15,700.00  
18                 
14,494.45  
          
37,777.86  
0.135 55.38% 44.62% Jun-12 
# of trades          
10,061.36  
18                 
11,160.09  
          
26,121.24  
-0.178 42.92% 57.08% Jun-12 
Listed comp.                
722.71  
17                       
537.27  
                
886.75  
0.862 80.57% 19.43% Jun-12 
Market cap       
247,000.00  
15               
203,295.41  
       
228,646.53  
0.740 77.04% 22.96% Jan-06 
Value traded          
15,200.00  
14                   
9,949.60  
          
28,396.82  
0.692 75.55% 24.45% Jan-06 
# of trades            
6,263.59  
13                   
4,482.93  
          
11,315.11  
0.567 71.48% 28.52% Jan-06 
Listed comp.                
799.85  
13                       
559.07  
888.123 0.977 83.58% 16.42% Jan-06 
Market capitalisation, value traded: expressed in million USD. Number of trades: expressed in thousands. Listed companies: expressed in units. Source of the raw data: WFE Monthly reports.
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E. Long-term vs short-term inflows 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the coefficients reported in Tables 2 and 3 represent the long-
run influence of the regressors on cross-border equity inflows. Especially with respect to the 
levers and interventions coefficients, it would be interesting to understand for how long these 
policies are effective. To make a rough assessment, one can firstly compare the coefficients 
in Table 2 and 3 with the Summary Statistics reported in Table 1: inclusion in the MSCI 
Emerging Markets Index is estimated to attract foreign inflows for roughly 250 million USD, 
more than the average quarterly inflows, but less than the average semi-annual inflows. 
Therefore, one might expect this policy to be effective for a period of four to five months.  
We estimate the specifications in Table 3 using a dynamic panel data model to more carefully 
quantify for how long interventions remain effective after implementation. Estimation of 
dynamic panel data models presents several well-acknowledged problems that lead to bias in 
the within group estimator (Anderson & Hsiao, 1982; Arellano & Bond, 1991; Nickell, 1981). 
In this context, however, where estimation is performed on a ‘large T, small N’ panel, bias 
problems should be minimized, as when T is large the dynamic within-group estimator is 
proven to be consistent (Bond, 2002). As the average number of periods in our estimation is 
more than 100, we safely conjecture that a dynamic within-group estimator would be 
consistent.36  
In this framework, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable can be interpreted as the 
rate of convergence to the long-run coefficient. In our estimations, the coefficient of the 
                                                          
36 Results of this estimation are available upon request.  
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lagged dependent variable is 0.18. At this rate of convergence, we estimate the influence of 
the policies to be negligible after 4-5 months, consistently with our initial assessment. Figure 
D1 graphically illustrates the result.  
Figure D1: Influence of being included in the MSCI EM Index 
Note: elaboration based on the estimation of a DPD model (specification of Table 3, column (4)). 
We also follow Edison and Warnock (2010) and we estimate the models in Table 3 using 
quarterly, semi-annual and annual inflows as dependent variables. Consistently, we find that 
the interventions have some statistical significance on quarterly inflows, but not on semi-
annual and annual inflows.37 
 
                                                          
37 Results of these estimations are available upon request.  
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